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This paper investigates the effects of trade liberalization on labor demand elasticities. Employment
demand equation is estimated by using data (1971-1996) for manufacturing industries in Tunisia. Results from
empirical testing using the model find a weak support for the idea assuming that trade liberalization will lead
to an increase in labor demand elasticities: in the vast majority of the industries we consider, we cannot reject
the hypothesis of no relationship between trade openness and labor-demand elasticities. This weakness of labor
demand elasticity in practice is perhaps explained by the tight labor market regulations in place during the 1987-
96. However, our results are robust to the type of labor considered (contract labor and permanent labor). This
supports the conclusion that under liberalization period labor markets have become more flexible, and that
employers prefer recruiting contracts worker.
 
Résumé :  Libéralisation commerciale et élasticités
de la demande de travail : Le cas de la Tunisie
Ce papier étudie les effets de la libéralisation des échanges sur les élasticités de la demande du travail.
Une équation de demande d’emploi est estimée en se fondant sur des données (1971-1996) portant sur six
industries manufacturières tunisiennes. Les résultats des tests économétriques ne vérifient pas l’idée que la
libéralisation des échanges peut permettre une augmentation de l’élasticité de la demande du travail. Dans la
majorité des industries considérées, l’hypothèse de l’absence d’une relation entre l’ouverture commerciale et
l’élasticité demande de travail ne peut pas être rejetée. La faiblesse de l’élasticité de demande de travail peut être
expliquée par les régulations du marché du travail mises en place durant 1987-1996. Cependant, les résultats sont
robustes par rapport au type de statut du travail considéré (main-d’œuvre contractuelle et permanente). Ces
résultats confortent l’idée qu’au cours de la période de libéralisation, le marché du travail est devenu plus
flexible, et que les chefs d’entreprise préfèrent embaucher des travailleurs contractuels. 
JEL Classification: F02, E12, F13, L60.
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Feenstra and Hanson (1996; 1997), and Hanson and Harrison (1999). 
  In this regard, our study is set in a better context than the one examined by Slaughter (1997) whose focus instead is on US
2
trade policy changes over the last decades which were rather less pronounced and more difficult to measure.
1. Introduction
Trade reforms, even though considered to be welfare enhancing in the aggregate, do not have a uniform
impact on all sections of society. Most economists like to think about the impact of these reforms in terms of
their consequences for capitalists and workers. For example, in the presence of intersectoral factor mobility,
opening up an economy to international trade in goods will help labor and hurt capital or vice versa, depending
on whether to country’s comparative advantage is in labor-or capital-intensive products. In fact, there is an
important, ongoing debate on whether trade hurts or benefits unskilled labor relative to skilled worker (the
owners of human capital), to which already many well-known scholars in the area have contributed.  
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A new aspect of the trade-labor linkage that has received some attention in recent years is the impact of
international trade in goods on labor demand: the possibility, particularly in imperfectly competitive contexts,
for the elasticity of demand for labor to be higher with greater openness. The importance of this element of the
labor-market impact of trade was first emphasized by Rodrick (1997). He argues that trade makes the demand
for labor more elastic which in turn leads to larger employment and wage shocks as a result of given vertical
shifts in the labor-demand curve (arising from shocks to productivity or to output demand). Also, this increase
in elasticity leads to the erosion of the bargaining power of labor vis-à-vis capital in the sharing of supernormal
profits. And finally, it also results in labor bearing a larger burden of the impact of non-wage labor costs. Thus,
through this channel, workers are placed under greater pressure as a result of trade liberalization (see Slaughter
(1997) for a detailed discussion of these effects). However, the vast majority of empirical literature has mainly
a developed country focus. In contrast, the linkages between trade and labor markets are yet to be explored
thoroughly in the context of developing countries. This paper takes a step in this direction by analyzing the
relationship between labor markets and international trade in the Tunisian context.
Why does increase in openness lead to an increase in labor-demand elasticity? The benefits to Tunisia
form this trade liberalization should be substantial, and should pass through various channels (see Papi and
Zazzaro, 2000). In addition, trade liberalization leads to lower prices for imported goods. Since Tunisia is an
importer of capital equipment, and given complementarity between capital and employment, the employment
rises. According to the standard theory of international trade, following integration, employment and total factor
productivity should increase. First, the increases are a result of the better allocation of existing resources (the
statistic effect) and the greater competitiveness of markets, goods, and factors, as well as the expansion of
potential markets, and the full exploitation of scale and scope economies (the dynamic effect). Secondly,
employment and efficient allocation of labor increase as a result of foreign and domestic investments stimulated
by policies of trade liberalization. Thus, the advantages of foreign investments take the form not only of an
immediate increase in aggregate demand, but also of knowledge transfers, opportunities to gain professional
expertise, and commercial contracts. 
However, employment benefits will pass through new investment, and the reallocation of production
factors, to sectors with greater competitive advantages, and consequently, a general strategy for reform and
modernization. A striking example of this is the plan for industrial restructuring and modernization (« mise à
niveau program »). The aim of this plan is to prepare Tunisian manufacturing firms for the liberalization of
markets and the greater competition that will arise. This program has been accompanied by generous tax breaks
for investment in the exporting sector, progressive rationalization of the regulatory framework, and infrastructure
development. To increase the flexibility of labor regulations, the labor code was revised in 1994, and again in
1996, to clarify the conditions under which workers can be laid off for cost saving reasons and to establish
guidelines for financial compensation.
This paper attempts to investigate the link between trade openness and factor demand elasticities
empirically. We start by specifying an econometrically implementable theoretical model of an industry operating
in an imperfectly competitive context and derive predictions about the implications of changes in trade policy
for labor demand elasticities. This is then tested using data from the Tunisian manufacturing sector from a period
when there were scale changes in the level of trade protection (specifically, the trade reforms of 1986). This data
set provides a unique opportunity to test the impact of trade policy on labor demand elasticities. It has several
appealing features: First, if it is the case that greater openness generally results in larger factor demand
elasticities, we should expect to see its effects after this particular reform . Second, the data are of higher
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frequency than is typical: since manufacturing censuses are typically only conducted once every 3 or 5 years in
most countries, one is usually only able to obtain two or three observations per industry in about a decade - a
period over which there may typically be multiple shifts in trade policy. Thus, in most cases, extracting
information about the impact of a single shift in trade policy on industries is difficult. Our data, however, are2  DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL NO.  94
annual, thus mitigating this concern. Third, this data set has already been used previously by Haouas, Yagoubi
and Heshmati (2003) to examine labor use efficiency in manufacturing industries. It, thus, permits an industry-
by-industry comparison and conciliation of speed of adjustment with impact on labor markets.
Our analysis suggests that the linkage between greater trade openness and labor demand elasticities as
suggested by the theory may be empirically quite weak: in the vast majority of the industries we considered, we
are unable to reject the hypothesis of no relationship between these variables. As we discuss in detail in the
paper, this finding remains robust to changes in the type of labor considered (all production workers, female
labor, etc.) and quite robust to changes in specification as well.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 some recent applications on developing
countries are presented. Section 3 describes the Tunisian reforms briefly. Section 4 outlines the basic theoretical
structure and derives the estimating equation. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 discusses the primary
econometric concerns and presents the econometric results. Section 7 discusses how we can reconcile our results
with the finding of Haouas, Yagoubi and Heshmati (2003). Section 8 concludes. 
2.  Some Recent Applications on Developing Countries
There are few studies which in one or another way are relevant to the relationship between labor demand
elasticities and trade liberalization in developing countries. In the following we briefly review a number of such
studies. 
Using industry-level data disaggregated by states, Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy (2003) finds a positive
impact of trade liberalization on labor-demand elasticities in the Indian manufacturing sector. These elasticities
turn out to be negatively related to protection levels that vary across industries and over time. Furthermore, they
find that these elasticities are not only higher for Indian states with more flexible labor regulations; they are also
impacted to a larger degree by trade reforms. Finally, he finds that after reforms, volatility in productivity and
outputs gets translated into larger wage and employment volatility, theoretically a possible consequence of larger
labor-demand elasticities.
Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000) use establishment level data to provide consistent dynamic estimates
of labor demand functions for three Latin American countries (Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) across trade policy
regimes. The results show that estimates of elasticities do change greatly in magnitude, if not significantly so,
over time and that comparisons across countries should take this into account when attempting to make inference
about the flexibility or efficiency of labor markets. But more important, the data provide only very mixed support
for the idea that trade liberalization has an impact on own wage elasticities and no consistent patterns emerge.
Using Turkish plant level data spanning the course of dramatic trade liberalization, Krishna, Mitra and
Chinoy (2001) investigate empirically the link between trade openness and factor demand elasticities. Their
analysis suggests that the putative linkage between greater trade openness and labor demand elasticities may be
quite week. They explain this weakness by the variety of frictions that affect the labor demand decisions of firms.
3.  The Tunisian Reforms
Like many countries in the region, Tunisia pursued a policy macroeconomic stabilization and exchange
rate adjustment until the mid-1980s, where taxes on imports progressively increased and often exceeded 100 per
cent of the import prices. During this period the manufacturing evolved through a highly regulated economic
environment. These controls had a direct or indirect bearing on how the manufacturing sector used resources.
In the labor market, for example, the government introduced minimum wages and adopted a rigid wage structure,
which prevent a close linkage between base wages and performance-based bonus. Additionally, employers were
prohibited to dismiss workers. Dismissal of workers should only take place following administrative approval
by the government employment authorities. The effect is that laziness and absenteeism have become difficult
to punish, resulting in lower productivity. Other than labor market controls, there were practices of prices,
foreign currency and investment controls as well. 
However, the context became less favourable notably between 1984-1986, because of several negative
factors (the fall in oil prices, the return of 30,000 workers who had immigrated to Libya, the conflicts between
government and trade unions). These events and the emergence of a strong radical ‘Islamic group’ have
constituted an obstacle for economic development. The political instability scared foreign and Tunisian investors
and deterred them from creating projects, a fact which has reverberated negatively on growth and job creation.TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR DEMAND  ELASTICITIES:  EVIDENCE FROM TUNISIA 3
  For evaluation of the effects of trade liberalization on employment and wages in other developing countries, see Brecher
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(1974), Levinsohn (1999), and Beyer et al. (1999). 
  GATT (1994), TPRM, for unweighted average tariff rates and ranges.
4
  Of course issues of counterfactuals and causality arise. The expansion of exports may have been positively influenced (in
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part at least) by other external and non-policy factors. 
  According to Lakhoua (1998) these reforms have been accompanied by important social achievements; these include
6
intensification of job creation, income seems to be more evenly distributed than in most comparable countries and the incidence of
poverty to be correspondingly low.
  This approximates a situation in which there are a large number of varieties and each firm is an infinitesimal player but has
7
some power over the pricing of its product.
Table 1 : Tunisian manufacturing industries: effective protection rate and import volumes
Industry
Effective protection rate (%) Imports (Millions of dinars)
1986 1990 1995 1986 1990 1996
Food 421 100 115 236 272.7 321.9
Construction material & ceramic 40 82 85 53.7 69.8 76.8
Mechanical electric industry  88 101 169 1683.2 1952.8 1973
Chemical 88 78 65 524.5 619.6 585.6
Textile, clothing & leather  194 73 132 612.6 991.2 1316.2
Other manufacturing 101 80 102 244.3 486.8 439
Source : a. Boudhiaf (2000) ; b. National accounts from the Tunisian National Statistic Institute (INS) and statistics from the
Quantitative Economy Institute (IEQ).
In addition, as the State continued a very important public investment policy despite these handicaps, it was
obliged to borrow massively, including from commercial banks, so Tunisia was threatened by a financial crisis.
This situation resulted in, the eviction of the President Bourguiba and his replacement by Prime Minister Ben
Ali in November 1987. This political change allowed Tunisian authorities to accept conditions imposed by the
World Bank and the IMF on exchange for financial assistance. 
Since 1987, numerous measures have been taken to further liberalize international trade: the structural
adjustment programme (1987), adherence to the General Agreement on Terms of Trade (1989), participation and
signature to the Uruguay Round agreement (1993), adherence to the World Trade Organization (1994), and
signing of a Free-Trade Agreement with the European Union (1995). According to Boudhiaf (2000), the
consequences of these measures on international trade liberalization for Tunisia spread over three periods.
3
During the initial period of trade liberalization (1987-1990), the level of protection for the economy was greatly
lowered. During the second period (1990-1995) the nominal and effective rate of protection increased in general
except for some products. This increase is explained by the consequences of the Uruguay Round that transformed
non-tariff protection into their tariff equivalent. Finally, during the third period (1995-1998), the nominal
protection rate on agriculture increased, while the nominal protection rate for industrial products decreased
significantly. The GATT 1994 review of Tunisia’s trade policies estimates the unweighted average legal tariff
rate (including surcharges) at 33%, and the range 0-73%.  This compares to ranges prior to reform of 5-236%
4
and average tariff rate of 36% for the period 1981-1986. The second liberalization period introduced major
changes, mainly in import trade volume  (see Table 1). It is against the background of policy changes outlined
5
above that a study of the adjustment process of the impact of these reductions in trade protection on labor
markets becomes essential.   
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4.  Theory and Estimation Framework
To demonstrate theoretically how changes in trade policy resulting in greater product market competition
and larger product market elasticities, and to establish theoretical underpinnings for the empirical work to follow,
we work with a model of monopolistic competition, where each firm faces its own less than infinitely elastic
demand curve and where there is assumed to be no strategic interaction between firms . Thus, any firm i in
7
industry j is assumed to face an inverse demand curve of the type:
(1)4  DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL NO.  94
where denotes own price,  denotes industry average price,   is a scaling factor,   denotes firm output
and  denotes the (constant) price elasticity of demand. The production function is assumed to be a Cobb-
Douglas type (in variable inputs), and given by:
(2)
where   denotes  kth input in use here.
The firm is assumed to face infinitely elastic factor supplies, i.e., it takes factor prices as given. Partially
differentiating profits with respect to the lth input and equating it to zero gives us the following first order
condition:
(3)
where   denotes the price of the lth input. In log form, (3) can be rewritten as:
(4)
where the  values are each a function of  . Substituting the FOC for other inputs back into (4) above, we get:
(5)
which is a demand function for the lth input expressed in terms of the variables the firm takes as exogenous –
factor prices and the industry average price. The coefficients in the above equation are function of  . The own
price elasticity of an input is given by:
(6)
The derivative of the absolute value of the own price elasticity of input demand with respect to the product
demand elasticity is given by :
(7)
which shows the magnitude of the own price elasticity of factor demand is increasing in the product demand
elasticity (thus proving that the effects predicted by Hick’s Law are relevant in this context). The cross-price
elasticity of demand for inputs may be analogously derived and is given by:TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR DEMAND  ELASTICITIES:  EVIDENCE FROM TUNISIA 5
  The theory clearly applies to all input factors. However, we focus only on labor demand since any effort estimating demand
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equations for other factors would be frustrated by the fact that firm level data on the use of the other factors and/or factor prices is not
available.
  Using the annual survey on firms made by the INS derived permanent and contract workers.
9
  Capital price is assumed equal to the price of acquiring new capital or PFCFB (“prix de formation de capital fixe par branche
10
d’activité”).




We now specialize to the case where the only inputs are labor, capital, and energy. Additionally, we let w, r, m
and f denote the logs of the wage rate, the rental rate, capital price and energy price, respectively, and each
deflated by the industry-level average output price. Finally, we focus our attention on the demand for labor alone
(as opposed to that for other factor inputs).  The labor demand function is then given by:
8
(9)
where l is the log of labor demanded. Thus, our final estimating equation is
(10)
where the error term   allows for random shocks to affect the firm’s demand for labor.
5. The  Data
The data used in this study has been assembled using a diversity of sources (national accounts from the
Tunisian National Statistic Institute (INS) and statistics coming from the Quantitative Economy Institute (IEQ)
and central bank of Tunisia). We did so in order to allow the construction of an integrated database of industrial,
labor market and trade statistics feasible. Thus, we have a panel on 6 manufacturing industries from 1971 to
1996. The data are annual. These 6 industries are included in the free trade agreement of 1995 between Tunisia
and the European Union. The industries included are food industry, textiles, clothing and leather industry,
chemical industry, construction material, ceramic and glass industry, mechanical electric industry, and other
manufacturing industry (including paper and pulp, plastics, etc.). Table 1 lists the volume of import and effective
protection rate by industry. 
Our interest in this paper is in labor market effect of trade liberalization. To estimate equation (10), we
need data on input prices faced by the firm and labor employed. The dependent variable is measured as total
employment in each industry (L). For robustness, we also estimate (10) using other categories of labor,
specifically, contract workers, and permanent workers.  The independent variables in the labor demand part of
9
the model are average wages (w), capital price (m) , and energy price (f). Economy-wide interest rate data
10
(borrowing costs) were used as rental costs.  
11
Wages are defined as average annual wage per worker. It is obtained by dividing total wages in each
industry by the total number of employees in that industry. Thus, the wage variable is industry specific. The
average wages are then transferred to fixed 1971 prices using the producer price index. Wages, material price
and energy price are given in Tunisian Dinars.
6. Empirical  Analysis
As described in the introduction, a more liberal trade policy may be expected to raise labor-demand
elasticity. We now examine the evidence for these possibilities. Equation (10) derived in the previous section
is our basic estimating equation. We begin by considering OLS estimates of the own price labor demand
elasticity, the cross capital price labor demand elasticity, and the own price labor demand elasticity by worker
type separately for each industry. However, without adequately controlling for other policies, one risks
confounding the effects of trade liberalization with other structural reforms. Also, there may be severe
endogeneity problems - unobserved demand shocks may not be orthogonal to trade intensity so that OLS
estimates may be biased and inconsistent. This requires that we use a fixed effects model. To take into account
the unobserved sectoral variation we use industry-specific fixed effect dummies. We capture the effects of trade6  DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL NO.  94
 To the extend that, say, aggregate demand or productivity shocks increase product demand and raise labor demand and
12
increase wages (or any other factor prices for that matter) at the same time, the elasticity estimates delivered from equation (6) would
be biased due to the correlation between the error term and the right-hand side variable. 
liberalization on the parameters in (10) by the use of a liberalization dummy, which takes the value 0 up to 1986
and 1 thereafter. 
6.1  Labor Demand Elasticities with Respect to Wages
Table 2 presents results for labor demand elasticities and their changes in each of the 6 industries, under
the fixed effects and random effects models. The estimated elasticities ( ) lie within the range of –0,213 to
–0,453. Thus, this fall well within what Hammermesh (1993) has identified as being a reasonable range of values
for labor demand elasticities. In the six cases, across both types of estimates, the elasticity estimates are quite
tightly estimated and in line with previous studies.
Table 2 :  Own price labor demand elasticity estimates
Industry Fixed effects OLS estimates
*w )*w *w )*w
Food
Construction material and ceramics
Mechanical electric industry
Chemical
Textile, clothing and leather
Other manufacturing
R² adjusted
-0.302          (0.031)
-0.396          (0.042)
-0.312          (0.047)
-0.453          (0.024)
-0.213          (0.080)
-0.263          (0.020)
 0.994
-0.010          (0.038)
0.007            (0.024)
-0.002          (0.212)
-0.046          (0.021)
0.029            (0.012)
0.003            (0.070)
 0.667
-0.223          (0.021)
-0.295          (0.035)
-0.293          (0.057)
-0.448          (0.029)
-0.197          (0.038)
-0.201          (0.024)
 0.998
0.011            (0.070)
-0.012          (0.092)
0.009            (0.070)
-0.053          (0.026)
0.042            (0.013)
-0.008          (1.254)
 0.453
Notes: figures in parentheses are standard errors.
The parameter of interest here is elasticity change, i.e., the parameter corresponding to the wage variable
interacted with the liberalization dummy ( ). As the columns 2 and 4 in the Table 2 indicate, our estimates
of the interaction term involving wages and the post-1986 dummy are small in magnitude and largely
insignificant.  In four out of 6 cases, under both OLS and fixed effects estimates, the null hypothesis that the
change in elasticity after the reforms is zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level or indeed in most cases at even
a higher level of significance. The two industries where the null hypothesis of no elasticity change is rejected
are chemical and textile, clothing and leather. In these cases the   estimate is negative and positive, implying
that the absolute value of the own price labor demand elasticity goes up. It appears thus in the vast majority of
the industries considered separately we are unable to find statistically and economically significant relationship
between these variables. 
This lower responsiveness of labor demand elasticities to trade liberalization was expected because of
the job security regulations in force. Employers could not easily fire workers, even if there were increase in wage
costs. Despite recent progress government role is still important and the number of layoffs is still controlled for
both private and public firms. Despite the recent reform of the labor code the time required to obtain a
retrenchment for economic reasons remains long in practice, hampering necessary restructuring. 
Several issues regarding the validity of the estimation framework and the interpretation of the results
arise. First in the familiar issue of possible simultaneity and correlation between the error term and the right-hand
side variable. Since both labor demand and labor supply depend upon the wage, shocks to the labor demand will
result in shocks to the wage.  Thus the wage and the disturbance term in our estimating equation may be
12
correlated, thereby raising the possibility of bias in our estimates. 
The second issues concerns that of timing and lagged responses. It is assumed in our estimation of (10)
that firm demand response to changes in wage occurred without lags. As Hammermesh (1993) has noted, much
of the adjustment in firm labor demand takes place within 6 months to 1 year. Thus, given that our data are
annual, this is not a serious problem.
A third issue is that data indicate that the measured wage is quite different across industries. We believe
that this reflects unobserved differences in worker quality across industries or to a smaller extent due to
differences in the number of hours on the job put in by workers in different industries. Given such differences,
it will be reasonable to expect that labor demand itself could be somewhat different across industries. Of course,
to the extent that the differences are simply in levels and are fixed over time – our industry specific intercept
should take care of the problem.TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR DEMAND  ELASTICITIES:  EVIDENCE FROM TUNISIA 7
  This parameter corresponds to the capital price variable interacted with the liberalization dummy.
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  Indeed, we indicate that Tunisian labor regulation allows firms to recruit by fixed term contracts and seasonal personnel,
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and to dismiss them without any indemnity at the end of their contract. 
6.2.  Labor Demand Elasticities with Respect to Capital Price
Cross capital price elasticities (of labor demand) and their changes following the trade reform were not
estimated with great precision. Hardly any of the estimates were significant at the 5% level or even at higher
levels. OLS and Fixed effects estimates of the cross capital price labor demand elasticity estimates are presented
in Table 3. The estimated elasticities range ‘between' 0.012 to -8.047, but only three cases are statistically
significant.  We are not greatly surprised by these estimates and their lack of significance- with few exceptions;
the literature has traditionally found cross price elasticities to be rather difficult to estimate.
Tableau 3 :  Cross capital price labor demand elasticity estimates
Industry Fixed effects OLS estimates
*m )*m *m )*m
Food
Construction material and ceramics
Mechanical electric industry 
Chemical
Textile, clothing and leather
Other manufacturing
R² adjusted
3.172        (3.127)
0.234        (0.932)
-8.047       (3.014)
-2.213       (1.124)
1.458        (0.851)
0.012        (0.017)
0.753
2.007        (1.869)
0.017        (0.980)
-2.033       (1.015)
-1.717       (0.673)
0.558        (0.381)
0.007        (0.020)
 0.892
3.125        (3.138)
0.214        (0.920)
-7.045       (2.015)
-2.002       (0.828)
1.326        (0.727)
0.011        (0.055)
0.885
1.836       (1.184)
0.013        (0.635)
-2.036       (1.011)
-1.058       (0.370)
0.226        (0.474)
0.004        (0.081)
 0.789
Notes: figures in parentheses are standard errors.
As the Table 3 indicates, our estimates of the changes in labor demand elasticities ( )  are largely
13
insignificant. Under both the OLS and fixed effects estimates, there are only two industries were the null
hypothesis of no elasticity change is rejected. These industries are Chemical and Mechanical electric industry.
6.3.  Labor Demand Elasticities (and changes) by Worker Type
For robustness (and also independent interest in variations in labor demand elasticities across worker
types), we estimate equation (10) by considering the demand for contract workers and permanent workers
separately. The elasticities again are quite tightly estimated (see Table 4). However, as expected, their values are
higher in magnitude than the ones for overall labor as substitution possibilities are higher when we look at
specific kinds of labor than in the case of labor in general. For contract workers, most elasticity estimates are
between -1 and -3, while for permanent workers, labor demand seems to be inelastic. Changes in elasticity are
again mostly insignificant following the reforms: significant negative value for   are produced in Food for
permanent workers, and significant positive values are produced in Food, Textile, clothing and leather, and Other
manufacturing for contracts workers.
Tableau 4 :  Own price labor demand elasticity by worker type: fixed effects estimates
Industry Contract worker Permanent worker
*w )*w *w )*w
Food
Construction material and ceramics
Mechanical electric industry 
Chemical
Textile, clothing and leather
Other manufacturing
R² adjusted
-1.282       (0.231)
-2.618       (0.405)
-0.832       (0.052)
-1.883       (0.199)
-2.915       (1.303)
-1.144       (0.155)
 0.986
0.246        (0.113)
-0.502       (0.487)
-0.099       (0.063)
-0.163       (0.071)
1.187        (0.638)
0.154        (0.053)
 0.956
-0.761       (0.408)
-0.374       (0.234)
-0.247       (0.155)
-0.359       (0.147)
-1.112       (0.134)
-0.856       (0.262)
 0.976
-0.242       (0.072)
-0.381       (0.263)
0.577        (0.847)
0.277        (0.157)
-0.050       (0.367)
-0.231       (0.261)
 0.923
Notes: figures in parentheses are standard errors.
The positive association between wage and contract labor in these sectors can be explained by labor
regulation reforms. In fact, to increase flexibility of labor regulations, the Tunisian labor code was revised in
1994 and 1996. As a result, in some sectors, fixed term contracts and sub-contractual arrangements now account
for 90%of labor contracts.  Contracts labor seems to be the obligated passage to enter in labor markets and it
14
is absolutely correlated with the unemployment of younger people in Tunisia.8  DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL NO.  94
  While instrumental variables estimation is perhaps a more satisfactory approach, it proves a little less feasible in this context:
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other than lagged endogenous variables, we have no variable in the data set that we may regard as being exogenous. Estimating (10) using
lagged variables as IVs resulted in highly insignificant (and sometimes meaningless) estimates of the parameters of interest. One option
that presents itself then is the pooling of data across industries to use lagged variables as instruments. These results are presented in Table
5 and are discussed later along with other results from the pooled sample.
 We are should to note some caveats associated with pooling data across industries.
16
  For a given level of value added, chemical could be better of by reducing employment by 63,8% and textile by 59,8%.
17
 Employment adjustment is 23% in chemical industry and 6,1% in textile industry. 
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6.4.  Results of Estimation Using Data Pooled Across Industries
Our penultimate set of regressions used data pooled across all the 6 manufacturing industries. The results
are presented in Table 5. As noted earlier, this was done with the intention of using instrumental variables
techniques to control for any remaining simultaneity problems in the framework.  Pooling of the data also
15
allows us to use variations in cross industry changes in import penetrations ratios as proxies for the reform
dummies.
16
We start first with estimates of equation (10) using pooled data and using lagged right-hand side
variables as instruments (Regression 1). The IV estimates for the pooled sample gives us an elasticity that is not
as precisely estimated (although the point estimate appears to be in a reasonable quantitative range) and again
we cannot reject the null that the trade reform did not have any effect on the labor demand elasticity. The point
estimate of change in elasticity is economically insignificant.
Regression 2 uses import penetration interactions (impp). The coefficient of the cross product of impp
and the log of wage gives us , the derivative of the labor demand elasticity with respect to the
import-penetration ratio. The labor demand elasticity at zero import penetration, , is significantly estimated
to be –0.711. The estimate for   is –0.213 and is significant at 1%. Surprisingly and counter-
intuitively, the sign of this coefficient shows that higher imports are associated with higher magnitude of labor
demand elasticities. In this regard, Haouas, Yagoubi and Heshmati (2002) find a positive effect of import on
employment. They explain this result by the fact that Tunisia is an importer of manufactured goods. The
complementarity between capital and employment is a factor that explains the rise in employment following an
increase in import.   
Tableau 5 : Labor demand elasticity estimates over all industries
Regression 1
(Instrumental variable estimates with time dummy interactions
Regression 2
(Instrumental variable estimates with import penetration)
*w
)*w
 -0.634  (0.650)
 -0.263   (0.178)
*w
M*w/M(impp)
 -0.711  (0.098)
 -0.213  (0.014)
7.  Reconciliation with the Haouas, Yagoubi 
and Heshmati (2003) Results
Our finding that greater trade openness did lead to significant labor demand elasticities in Tunisia at first
thought seems somewhat consistent with Haouas, Yagoubi and Heshmati’s (2003) finding. In fact, if the two
industries where the null hypothesis of no elasticity change is rejected are chemical and textile, clothing and
leather, this is no surprise. Haouas, Yagoubi and Heshmati (2003) find that Chemical and textile, clothing and
leather are the most inefficient in the use of labor.  This inefficiency can be explained by the extensive
17
utilization of human capital. The technical infrastructure is used only partially. Industries less efficient would
be expected to adjust faster (as they try to eliminate their inefficiency faster) than those most efficient. In other
words, industries closer to the labor requirement frontier would be expected to have a lower speed of adjustment
after liberalization than industries farther away from it.
Results from Haouas, Yagoubi and Heshmati (2003) indicate that chemical and textile, clothing and
leather adjust faster under the liberalization period than the other sector.
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In fact the negative correlation between labor and capital price in Chemical and Mechanical electric
industry industries after trade liberalization can be explained by the structural change favorable to branches that
made intensive use of skilled worker and technology as opposed to sectors with intensive use of unskilled labor.
Consequently, the number of production workers - a larger category of workers in Tunisian industries -TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR DEMAND  ELASTICITIES:  EVIDENCE FROM TUNISIA 9
decreased, while skilled labor - a small category - increased. As Haouas, Yagoubi and Heshmati (2003) indicate,
the production process in these sectors becomes capital intensive after trade liberalization. 
8. Conclusion
Our analysis of the impact of trade reforms on labor demand elasticities using industry level data over
a period spanning major trade reforms in the Tunisian economy suggests that the putative linkage between
greater trade openness and labor demand elasticities (as suggested by theories of the type we present in this
paper) may empirically quite weak: in the vast majority of the industries we considered separately, we are unable
to find statistically and economically significant relationship between these variables. Our results are robust to
the type of labor considered (contract labor and permanent labor). This non-responsiveness of labor demand
elasticity in practice is perhaps explained by the tight labor market regulations in place during the 1987-1996.
However, the results, indicated above, support the conclusion that under the liberalization period labor markets
have become more flexible, and that employers are able to recruit contracts worker in some sectors. 
These findings have important implications for public policy and highlight some challenge for policy-
making. Although our results suggest that tighter labor regulations-through restrictions on retrenchments and
layoffs, for example, - can dampen change in labor elasticities, it is hard to believe that more widespread use of
such regulations is the desirable policy response. Particularly in the context of Tunisia’s growing integration with
the international economy, allowing Tunisian firms to be exposed to import competition but constraining their
ability to adjust their inputs in response is likely to put domestic firms at a serious disadvantage in terms of their
ability to compete. 
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